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Introduction
 D. T. Suzuki has had an extensive impact on the modern intelligentsia. 
There have been various reactions to his work, ranging from awe to rejection. 
As a way of grouping these reactions, I examine here how three key European 
psycho-analytic theorists have responded to Suzuki. I see these three 
reactions as being broadly representative of how others have dealt with his 
work.
Carl Jung
 Carl Jung wrote the “Foreword” for Suzuki’s book, An Introduction to Zen 
Buddhism, published in 1934. In this foreword, he expresses great admiration 
for Suzuki’s work in describing Zen and satori to Westerners. Jung believes 
that the experience of Zen and satori is “a way of enlightenment which is 
practically impossible for the European to appreciate.” (1949: 10) He also 
remarks that, “great as is the value of Zen Buddhism for the understanding 
of the religious transformation process, its use among Western people is very 
improbable. The spiritual conceptions necessary to Zen are missing in the 
West.” (1949: 24)
 What is to be noted here is Jung’s assumption that he will not be able 
to understand what Suzuki is fully saying. Jung feels he does not have the 
cultural resources necessary to effectively read Suzuki. Jung’s sense of 
distance from Zen and Suzuki is a respectful and humble one. He realizes 
he is in the presence of wisdom that he will not fathom. This is because with 
Zen we are dealing with insights and techniques which have been honed 
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over the centuries far away from the West. The religious institutions and 
philosophical movements of the West have never produced a similar spiritual 
movement to that of Zen. Psycho-therapy, according to Jung, is the closest 
we have. This is because psycho-therapy deals with the integration of the 
unconscious with the conscious. For Jung, “the unconscious is the matrix of 
all metaphysical assertions, of all mythology, all philosophy (in so far as it is 
not merely critical) and all forms of life which are based upon psychological 
suppositions.” (1949: 23) In other words, the unconscious communicates to 
us wisdom (as distinct from just mental problems). Zen’s success is being 
able to access the unconscious for such unfathomable wisdom. However, 
to practice Zen one needs to have emerged from a Zen culture, something 
absent in the West. One side remark worth making here is that, as far as this 
“Foreword” goes, Jung’s reasons for seeing Zen as something very alien to 
the West does not seem to be based on any notions of a “collective psyche” 
or “collective unconscious.” For Jung, the unconscious is common to all 
humans, it is just the way we access it that is culturally different.
 In reading Jung’s reading, one cannot help admire his generous spirit and 
open-mindedness. These are the words of a wise and kind listener. However, 
in terms of approaching Suzuki’s ideas there is something dissatisfying 
about this style of reading. The sense of awe at the otherness of Asia creates 
an atmosphere of apartness which, in the long run, can lead nowhere other 
than the cold and distant respect of non-intimate strangers. This tends to run 
against the tendency of humans to want to understand that which makes them 
curious. In fact, looking at Jung’s description of the unconscious, it would 
seem that any new ideas or philosophies we hear about cannot but penetrate 
our minds somewhere, somehow, eventually. The result is that we can never 
for very long read another with the intention of not reading them. Indeed, it is 
noteworthy that Miyuki Mokusen, a Japanese Jungian, would many decades 
later write an article in the Suzuki-founded Eastern Buddhist Journal entitled 
“The Psychodynamics of Buddhist Meditation: A Jungian Perspective” in 
which the author would express his hopes “that my discussion, which aims 
at communicating what I consider to be the essentials of my experience in 
Jungian analysis and Buddhist meditation will have a universal dimension.” 
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(1977: 156) People cannot help but knowing what they know from what they 
have read.
Eric Fromm
 Fromm’s reading of Suzuki shares the reverential tone of Jung, but unlike 
Jung, he feels that Suzuki offers something learnable and applicable if we 
take the time to read him fully and properly. For instance, Fromm footnotes 
a comment he makes about Zen as follows: “D. T. Suzuki’s writings on Zen 
Buddhism, […] are by far the best source for understanding the fundamental 
ideas of Zen Buddhism. Precisely because of their authenticity Suzuki’s 
books require more effort from the reader than a number of less authentic and 
‘easier’ books.” [My ellipses] (1999: 38)
 Fromm organized a conference to discuss the links between Zen and 
psychoanalysis in Mexico in 1957, at which D. T. Suzuki was the main 
speaker and center of focus. The psycho-analysts present were there to learn 
about Zen. It was not the other way around. (Suzuki wrote elsewhere: “Zen 
does not advocate an analytical method to reach the subjectum, for it knows 
this method has always an object for further analysis and can never achieve 
the end.” (1975: 1))
 The contrast between Jung and Fromm’s reactions to Suzuki can possibly 
be traced to contrasts in their respective psycho-analytic ideologies. Jung was 
to a large extent the conservative romantic who saw the organic wholeness of 
cultures and civilizations. Fromm was part of a broader humanist movement 
which was more interested in challenging the old structures, basing human 
action in the modern individual rather than the atavistic collective. Suzuki, 
with his emphasis on both the iconoclastic elements of Zen and the orientalist 
harmony of Japanese society, was in a unique position to range over, however 
artificially, this gap between romanticism and humanism.
 Fromm was, thus, in many ways archetypical of another kind of reader of 
Suzuki, the student or disciple one. Unlike Jung, who was happy to read exotic 
descriptions of Zen, shrug in wonder, and then move on, Fromm wanted to 
learn more about it, and to incorporate it into his own understandings and 
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experiences of the world. Many intellectuals in the West were similarly 
swayed by the power of Suzuki’s writings to become disciple-like readers. 
This power resided in Suzuki’s uncompromising assertion that what Zen had 
to say was, on the one hand, something of absolute truth, and on the other, 
something hereto alien to the Western mind. The rhetorical effects of such 
assertions—here I write about the mystery of life but you may not be able to 
read it—are too alluring to easily shirk off.
 However, the problem with this style of reading is that the reader, in 
loyalty to the master, will read anything into the text to paper-over cracks, 
contradictions, or conflicts that may appear. If we read Suzuki and find that 
the Zen religion of peace has a tendency to fetishize samurai swords, well, we 
must have misread him. Need to try harder.
Jacque Lacan
 The next Suzuki-reading psychoanalyst we look at is Jacques Lacan, in 
the guise of Slovaj Žižek. The reading is critical. Žižek takes Suzuki (and 
Buddhism in general) to task on a number of issues. To start with, there are 
two quotes from Suzuki’s writings that appeared in Brian Victoria’s Zen at 
War (1997) that seem to have particularly irked Žižek. The first one concerns 
a comment that appears in the chapter entitled “Zen and Swordsmanship II” 
in Suzuki’s widely read Zen and Japanese Culture (1959). Žižek uses the 
quote in both his “Foreword” to For they know not what they do (2002) and 
his book Less Than Nothing (2012). Suzuki (alas) wrote:
 … it is really not he but the sword itself that does the killing. He had no 
desire to do harm to anybody, but the enemy appears and makes himself 
a victim. It is as though the sword performs automatically its function of 
justice, which is the function of mercy. (1959: 145)
Next, there is Suzuki’s comment about Zen being apolitical to the extent that 
it could be compatible with Fascism (or any other political system). Žižek 
refers to (but does not quote) the comment in Less than Nothing. Here is the 
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original Suzuki quote.
 Zen has no special doctrine or philosophy, no set of concepts or intellectual 
formulas, except that it tries to release one from the bondage of birth and 
death, by means of certain intuitive modes of understanding peculiar 
to itself. It is, therefore, extremely flexible in adapting itself to almost 
any philosophy and moral doctrine as long as its intuitive teaching is 
not interfered with. It may be found wedded to anarchism or fascism, 
communism or democracy, atheism or idealism, or any political or 
economic dogmatisms.” (1959: 63)
Whereas previous readers would have seen such remarks as a challenge 
to our overly-moralizing Western dualistic ways of thinking, Žižek and 
similar critical readers are willing to take Suzuki on, stick up their hand 
and challenge the master. And indeed, Žižek’s criticisms are not limited to 
Suzuki’s politics and phony pacifism. There is also a broader critique of core 
Buddhist philosophy.
 Žižek asks in Less Than Nothing a basic question of Buddhism, “How 
did the Wheel of Desire emerge out of the eternal Void?” Hinayana and 
Mahayana avoid the question, but Vajrayana “hints at dark demonic forces” 
beyond (2012: 110). It is easy to see here the problem for non-theistic 
Buddhism which sees reality, when it is being suffered, as a splitting off from 
an undisturbed, unified reality. Where does the split come from? The dharma-
kaya cannot have willed it since this would involve personhood which would 
make it theistic, and less than benevolent at that. If we suffer because that is 
the way the world works, then this suggests brutal naturalism, which means 
that the miraculous and spiritual aspects of Buddhism, as recounted in the 
sutras, must be based on willful wishful thinking.
 Žižek also problematizes the final aims of Buddhism, the stopping of the 
wheel of life, the cycle of samsara. Buddhism cannot explain how this wheel 
can be stopped if one is to be still human. For psycho-analysis, the turning 
of the wheel makes us human. It is what we are as mindful creatures with 
consciousness shaped by the unrelenting churning of our inner drives. Žižek 
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summarizes the clash between Buddhism and psycho-analysis on this point 
as follows:
 What psychoanalysis adds to Buddhism is thus in fact a new version of 
Galileo’s eppur si muove: imagine a Lacanian being tortured by a New Age 
Western Buddhist into admitting that inner peace can be achieved; after 
the forced concession, as he leaves the room, he quietly mumbles: “But 
nonetheless, it continues to move!” (2012: 131)
Psycho-analysis out-koans Buddhism!
Après Lacan
 Is it possible to read Suzuki after Lacan/Žižek in a way that can counter 
these criticisms? What I propose here is not a strong or coherent response to 
Žižek, put rather the vague outlines of a possible reply. The aim is to seek 
a way of reading Suzuki that can take on board Žižek’s criticisms but still 
represent Suzuki as a worthwhile thinker. In other words, I seek to consider 
what a mature response to Žižek’s attack could look like. (An immature 
response, by the way, would look something like this: “Žižek is just a 
dualistic gaijin who will just never understand Zen. And Zen is beyond words 
anyway, no matter what he says.”)
Much to say
 In answer to the political charges against Suzuki, a plea must be made to 
read these remarks in the context in which they were produced. The remarks 
are, in themselves, indefensible, of course. Fascism is evil and killing people 
is always innately ugly, no matter what the cause. I have no argument there. 
However, I would counter that it is a bit of an over-reaction to brandish 
these remarks alone as evidence of fundamental thoughtcrime on Suzuki’s 
part. Sure, Suzuki said these things, but he said a lot of things. For instance, 
Noburu Koga in 1944 attended a lecture by Suzuki in Kamakura, and was 
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astonished to hear him say that Japan would lose the war. At the same event 
he heard Suzuki criticize young men being sent into the Kamikaze Tokubetsu 
Kōgekitai. As Koga remarks,「これは極め付き危険な、勇気を要する発言で
ある。十九年には東京空襲が始まり、言論統制が厳しくなり…」(“This was a 
genuinely dangerous and courageous statement to make. In 1944, the Tokyo 
air raids had begun, and restrictions on free speech had been greatly tightened 
…”) (Koga 2000: 3). Not to sound too clichéd about it, Suzuki was a complex 
person living in complicated times.
The many Zens
 It is fair to point out, however, that Žižek’s view is not that Suzuki was 
a closet fascist, but that because he viewed Zen as a technique, he was 
both unwilling and unable to morally judge and react to the militarism 
that emerged in his times. This is true to some extent, Suzuki did oversell 
the Samurai spiel in his Zen and Japanese Culture in a way that suggests 
remarkable naivety about the consequences of martial forces. But a response 
would be to say that for Suzuki “Zen” was many things, not just a technique. 
Zen was also a way of life (or what could be described as a vague system 
of social values) and an anti-dualist body of philosophy. That Suzuki was 
never willing to explicitly differentiate these different meanings of “Zen” 
was no doubt due to his conservative outlook which saw the organic whole of 
Japanese society. Japanese people think Zen philosophy which makes them 
live by Zen values, which makes them, now and again, do certain things, 
such as kendo, using Zen techniques. However, if we more carefully divide 
and separate the different meanings Suzuki gave to Zen, (which I list here as 
(1) Zen as technique, (2) Zen as a value system or way of life, and (3) Zen as 
non-dualistic philosophy) we can go some way towards answering the charge 
that Zen is a mere technique and as such useless when we need to take moral 
decisions and challenge exploitative social structures.
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Zen Technique
 If we go back to Suzuki’s comments about swordsmanship, we should note 
that the techniques of wielding the sword, whilst taking place in a frame of 
no-mind, also take place in a wider frame where the action to be engaged 
in has arisen due to some earlier (and not at all unconscious or no-mind) 
decision having been made. A samurai facing his enemy still has to decide 
who the enemy is. There is no Zen technique for doing this. (Otherwise the 
enemy army only has to lasso the samurai, spin him around, and send him 
back charging into his own lines, like a derailed flesh-chopping maniac 
robot). Sure, Zen is a technique and as such could be practiced by fascists 
in certain limited contexts (as could psycho-therapy), but this is only one 
meaning of the word “Zen” as employed by Suzuki.
Zen way of life
 Suzuki was fairly explicit that Zen is not (solely) an esoteric training of 
the conscious, but is also a particular and concrete way of life that one can 
watch and observe in Japan. The contours of this way of life, the value system 
that informs it, are never explicitly listed but are not hard to see. For Suzuki 
the Zen life is agrarian and avoidant of social conflict. Social class functions 
not to exploit but to preserve a wider organic nation that nurtures all. It is a 
conservative vision, but hardly a fascist one in any fair usage of the term. The 
point is that far from seeing life as an illusion and hence of no intrinsic worth, 
Suzuki, when in Zen as way of life mode, sees life as joyous and valuable. 
And when Zen techniques are put into practice they are done so in the context 
of this wider frame of the Zen life. Again, my point is not to defend Suzuki’s 
social vision but to defend him from the attack that all he ever saw in Zen was 
mindless techniques for those who believe life is nothing.
Zen philosophy
 Indeed, if Suzuki’s writings were merely a celebratory portrait of a pre-
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modern pastoral nation made happy by Zen, there would not be much worth 
defending in them. However, I want to argue that there is a third meaning 
that Suzuki gave to Zen, and that is Zen as a non-dualistic philosophy. Of 
course Suzuki was always quick to push this meaning of Zen back into the 
second meaning, Zen as a way of life, with his constant declarations about 
the non-philosophical nature of Zen. But we must save Suzuki from his own 
muddled-thinking. If Zen is non-dualistic then it simply cannot be reduced to 
particularist, contingent, historically-embedded, culturally-specific practices, 
since this would trap it within fundamentally dualistic thinking.
 So how does Suzuki’s Zen philosophy work? This is how I read it. Other 
readers are welcome to read it differently. (But nationality must not grant any 
reader privileges over others. Let’s transcend together the odious Zen in the 
art of Japanese über-nationalist ideology maintenance.) So, Zen philosophy 
is grounded in experience of the world. Satori is, broadly, awareness by the 
mind of its own constructedness. It involves the seer and the seeing being one, 
a radical reflexitivity that is hard to express afterwards. The experience is in 
the real and of the real. It is absolute knowledge which means that it cannot 
be not known after it is known. This absolute knowledge is not to be confused 
with omniscience. Perhaps it should not be confused even with wisdom. This 
experience is hard to represent in the symbolic. Its truth-event can only be 
socially recognized, afterwards, in an (oh so revolutionary) Zen institutional 
or cultural setting where conventional and prior symbolic realms are not 
operational. The only way to express and explain Zen to others outside this 
culture zone is through the imaginary, which is why Suzuki’s accounts of Zen 
tended to be almost fictional: koan fables and samurai fantasies. However, 
the knowledge that satori grants, hard to position as it is in the symbolic 
order, does lead towards an unrelenting dialectic view of reality where A 
is B and therefore A is not B (Suzuki’s soku-hi logic). Perhaps, in the end, 
Suzuki’s philosophy was not a million miles away from Hegel and Lacan.
Eppur Si Muove
 Of the three readers of Suzuki examined above—Jung, Fromm, and 
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Lacan/Žižek—it is Lacan/Žižek who is probably the most helpful for 
bringing Suzuki forward into our times and making him still relevant for 
contemporary readers. An engaged critical reading of Suzuki can help us sift 
through his work with active and engaged eyes, and help us categorize and 
compartmentalize that which is of value and that which is junk.
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